A selection of key paragraphs can be found below the judgement.
I. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 5 § 3 OF THE CONVENTION
53. The Court observes that the seriousness of the charges against the applicant and the risk of his absconding or interfering with the investigation were mentioned in the initial orders for his detention (see paragraphs 7 and 8 above). On subsequent occasions the courts either extended the applicant’s detention without giving any reasoning or noted that there were no grounds to change the preventive measure (see paragraphs 16, 18, 20, 21 and 24 above). The District Court’s rulings on the applicant’s applications for release contained no specific reasoning that would satisfy the requirements of Article 5 § 3 either (see paragraphs 22, 25 and 26 above). The Court notes that the decisions on the applicant’s detention did not suggest that the courts had made an appropriate assessment of the facts relevant to the question of whether such a preventive measure was necessary in the circumstances applicable at the various stages of the proceedings. Moreover, with the passage of time, the applicant’s continued detention required further justification, but the courts did not provide any further reasoning. Furthermore, the domestic authorities did not consider any other preventive measures as an alternative to detention (see Osypenko v. Ukraine, no. 4634/04, §§ 77 and 79, 9 November 2010) prior to the applicant’s release on 5 September 2011.
55. Having regard to the above, the Court considers that by failing to address specific facts or consider other measures as an alternative to pre‑trial detention for a long time, and by relying essentially and routinely on the seriousness of the charges, the authorities extended the applicant’s detention pending trial on grounds that cannot be regarded as “sufficient” and “relevant” to justify its duration.
56. There has accordingly been a violation of Article 5 § 3 of the Convention.
II. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 6 § 1 OF THE CONVENTION
70. In the instant case, the proceedings were not particularly complex as they concerned one episode of crime and one suspect – the applicant. Furthermore, for the significant period of time during those proceedings the applicant was deprived of his liberty, which required the authorities to act with a particular diligence. This, however, was not the case. From the facts it appears that it took the investigating authorities one and a half month to resume the investigation after the District Court revoked its order about the applicant’s compulsory treatment in a psychiatric hospital and one more month to return the applicant from the hospital (see paragraphs 15 to 17 above). Other delays in the proceedings were caused by the case being remitted to the prosecution authorities for additional investigation on three occasions and remitted for retrial on two occasions.
71. Having regard to its case-law on the subject, the Court considers that in the instant case, the length of the proceedings was excessive and failed to meet the “reasonable time” requirement.
72. It follows that there has been a violation of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention.