Case of N.T. v. Cyprus (Application no. 28150/22)
A selection of key paragraphs can be found below the judgment.
73. The Court has already pointed out the evolving understanding of the manner in which rape is experienced by the victim and the development of law and practice in that area which reflects the evolution of societies towards effective equality and respect for each individual’s sexual autonomy (see M.C. v. Bulgaria, cited above, §§ 165-66). In its assessment of the State’s compliance with its positive obligations, the Court takes into account the importance of protecting the rights of victims. In conducting criminal proceedings, the authorities must ensure that the image, dignity and privacy of alleged victims of sexual violence are protected, including through the non-disclosure of information and personal data unrelated to the facts. In the Court’s view, it is essential that they avoid reproducing sexist stereotypes in court decisions, minimising gender-based violence and exposing women to secondary victimisation by using guilt-inducing and moralising language that discourages victims’ confidence in the justice system (see J.L. v. Italy, cited above, §§ 139-41).
76. Regardless of the above, the Court’s primary concern is not so much whether there was enough evidentiary material gathered, but whether the authorities adopted a consistent approach to the assessment of the available evidence, whether the final decision was sufficiently reasoned and convincing and, accordingly, whether the relevant criminal-law provisions and mechanisms were implemented effectively (see M.M.B. v. Slovakia, no. 6318/17, § 72, 26 November 2019).
77. In that regard, the Court notes that the decision to discontinue A.T.’s prosecution was not based on lack of corroborating evidence. Rather it was based on the alleged inconsistencies in the applicant’s statements. In this connection, the Court notes that the Deputy Attorney General, in his decision which ended up being the final determination in the case, heavily relied on the applicant’s expression of sympathy towards A.T., the fact that her friends had stopped talking to her, her uncertainty about whether she would have consented if there had been no violence and the possibility that she had sent the “wrong signals” to A.T. (see paragraph 36 above). The authorities, however, did not obtain a specialist’s analysis of the applicant’s reactions ‑ particularly considering her age at the time of the alleged rape, her prior relationship and emotional ties with A.T. and the possible effects of trauma (see I.C. v. Romania, cited above, § 58, and I.G. v. Moldova, no. 53519/07, § 43, 15 May 2012; compare, for example, M.P. and Others v. Bulgaria, no. 22457/08, § 111, 15 November 2011). Such particularities might have explained her hesitations both in reporting the alleged abuse earlier and in describing the facts.
83. As regards the complaint under Article 14 in conjunction with Articles 3 and 8 of the Convention, the Court considers that certain language and arguments used by the prosecutors and, ultimately, the Deputy Attorney General in assessing the present case (see paragraph 78 above) convey prejudices and sexist stereotypes liable also to discourage women’s confidence, as victims of gender-based violence, in the justice system (see J.L. v. Italy, cited above, § 141). The Court’s previous findings concerning the secondary victimisation suffered by the applicant are sufficient to enable it to conclude that the grounds of the decision of the Deputy Attorney General (as the final determination in the case) were imbued with discrimination on grounds of sex (compare, in relation to domestic violence classified as gender-based violence constituting in itself a form of discrimination against women, Opuz v. Turkey, no. 33401/02, § 184-91 and 200, ECHR 2009; Halime Kılıç v. Turkey, no. 63034/11, § 113, 28 June 2016; Tkhelidze v. Georgia, no. 33056/17, § 51, 8 July 2021; and A.E. v. Bulgaria, no. 53891/20, § 116, 23 May 2023).
84. In this connection, the Court observes that GREVIO has reported the existence of “rampant prejudices and patriarchal attitudes among the police” as well as the display of sexist and misogynist attitudes towards women victims of sexual violence by, inter alia, certain prosecutors who appeared to “have an inadequate understanding of the paradigmatic shift in proving rape” (see points 88 and 229 in paragraph 53 above). Thus, the Court concludes, on the basis of all the foregoing considerations, that the shortcomings of the national authorities, and specifically the methods used to assess the authenticity of the applicant’s consent, not only deprived her of appropriate protection but also exposed her to secondary victimisation, which also constitutes discrimination.