Case of Krpelik v. The Czech Republic (Application no. 23963/21)

A selection of key paragraphs can be found below the judgment.

79. The Court reiterates that Article 6 of the Convention does not prevent a person from waiving the right to aspects of procedure that may be part of the right to a fair trial of his or her own free will, either expressly or tacitly (see paragraph 76 above). However, where such a right is waived, the Court must examine whether the circumstances surrounding the waiver were compatible with the requirements of the Convention, ensuring the waiver did not damage a matter of public interest and that there had been minimum safeguards in place commensurate with the importance of the waiver and the rights waived.

80. In the present case, several experts reported that the applicant had a slight intellectual disability characterised by a low IQ (around 67: see paragraph 24 above). The Court has already acknowledged intellectual disability as grounds in itself for particular vulnerability (see A.- M.V. v. Finland, no. 53251/13, § 73, 23 March 2017). In Ibrahim and Others (cited above, § 274) and Beuze (cited above, § 150) it was further clarified that a person involved in criminal proceedings may be particularly vulnerable not only by reason of his or her age, but by reason of his or her mental capacity as well; adult suspects or defendants with intellectual disabilities may therefore fall within the category of particularly vulnerable persons. The Court has also accepted that a police interview is particularly stressful for a suspect with even a slight intellectual disability (see Hasáliková v. Slovakia, no. 39654/15, § 68, 24 June 2021, in which the applicant was assisted by a lawyer from her very first questioning).

82. The Court therefore considers that, given the vulnerability of the applicant as a result of his intellectual disability and the imbalance of power arising by the very nature of criminal proceedings, a waiver by him of an important right under Article 6 could only be accepted if it was expressed unequivocally and after the authorities had taken all reasonable steps to ensure that he was fully aware of his rights and could appreciate, as far as possible, the consequences of his conduct (see, mutatis mutandis, Panovits v. Cyprus, no. 4268/04, § 68, 11 December 2008). It observes in that connection that, despite the Government’s argument that the applicant’s offence was very simple, the applicant was liable to a prison sentence, which was ultimately imposed on him.

83. As to the Government’s argument that the applicant had been advised of his rights in accordance with domestic law, the Court observes that any information about the applicant’s procedural rights were given to him only by the first pages of the pre-printed forms on which his pre-trial statements had been written. That information did include the applicant’s right to remain silent and his right to choose a lawyer. There has been no allegation or other indication that any individualised advice about his situation and rights or any further explanation were provided to the applicant (see, mutatis mutandis, Zachar and Čierny v. Slovakia, nos. 29376/12 and 29384/12, § 70, 21 July 2015). It rather appears that at least on one occasion, on 20 May 2016, the information had simply been read to him, without his having any opportunity to go through the printed text at his own pace before signing it as a record (see paragraph 20 above).

84. The Court also observes that the relevant text would be challenging even for persons of full intellectual capacities and that it was rendered even more complex by the inclusion of references to various legal provisions which applied depending on the applicant’s current status (whether he was a person giving an explanation, an arrested person, a suspect, a charged person). In this respect, the Court points out that the applicant seems to have struggled even with the instructions he received later from his lawyer (see paragraph 19 above). It therefore finds, given the circumstances of the present case, in which the applicant had a certain level of intellectual disability and was taken for questioning without any legal or other assistance, that it was unlikely that mere advice in the words provided for in the domestic law would have been enough to enable him to sufficiently comprehend the nature of his rights and to exercise them effectively.

94. The Court observes, however, that the right of an accused person to participate effectively in a criminal trial requires not only understanding the nature and consequences of the trial but also being able to sufficiently comprehend the nature of his rights and to exercise them effectively. The accused must also be able to understand the consequences of waiving the rights to be assisted by a lawyer and to remain silent. In the present case, the Court notes that the domestic courts assessed, on the basis of the evidence available, including the expert reports, the applicant’s capacity to stand trial and to represent himself effectively; however, they failed to assess his capacity to make a valid waiver of his right to legal assistance (see Savaş v. Turkey, no. 9762/03, § 68, 8 December 2009 ; and Akdağ, cited above, § 59); indeed, the issue of the waiver has been raised only by the Government.

97. The Court therefore finds that although the applicant had the benefit of adversarial proceedings in which he was represented by a court-appointed lawyer, the detriment he suffered at the pre-trial stage of the proceedings was not remedied in the subsequent proceedings in which his confession was held to be admissible as evidence.

98. Against that background, the Court finds that the circumstances surrounding the applicant’s alleged waiver of his right to legal assistance at the pre-trial stage, the insufficient scrutiny of that waiver by the courts and the failure to cure that flaw by any other procedural safeguards during the proceedings, coupled with the use by the trial court of the applicant’s pre-trial statements to convict him, rendered the trial as a whole unfair.

99. The foregoing considerations are sufficient to enable the Court to conclude that there has been a violation of Article 6 § 3 (c) in conjunction with Article 6 § 1 of the Convention.